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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERLY
And THE BAR
VOLUME XXVIII APRIL, 1922 NUMBER 3
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE*
By JOHN W. DAVIS**
There could be no better proof of the generosity of the legal
profession in general and of the bar of the state of New York in
particular than the fact that at one and the same moment you
admit a newcomer to the fellowship of your Association and to
the privileges of your floor. I beg to assure you that I do not lack
appreciation of this double honor. To enter one's name upon the
roll that bears and has' borne the names of so many who have
led both their profession and the nation, and to speak from a
platform which of itself gives distinction to its occupant, are hon-
ors indeed. In such circumstances to speak of duty seems lacking
in graciousness, and yet the thought of reciprocal obligation is not
wholly absent from my mind; for I cannot think that any Ameri-
can lawyer has fully met the rightful demands of his profession
until he has made himself an active member of his local, state and
national bar associations.
We are a scattered folk, we American lawyers. We issue from
a multitude of law schools after diversified courses of study, and
are admitted to the bars of our several jurisdictions under regula-
tions as multiform as legislative ingenuity forty-eight times multi-
plied can devise. Each for himself becomes speedily immersed
in subjects that in their variety run the whole gamut of human
experience, and random discipline is administered to us by a legion
of independent and disconnected tribunals. So far as I am aware,
* Address delivered before the New York State Bar Association, January 20, 1922.
** Member of the New York Bar and the West Virginia Bar.
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this situation is not paralleled among the lawyers of any other
country. The sole tie which unites us is that in a common language
we serve a common law and inherit from those who have gone be-
fore common traditions of loyalty, of service and of honor.
The duty to maintain and transmit these traditions unim-
paired stands in the forefront of those debts which every lawyer
owes to his craft; and since it is a thing only to be performed ef-
fectively by concerted action, it forms in and by itself a sufficient
reason for the formation of bar associations and makes the call
to membership in them imperative. Not only have the bar asso-
ciations of the United States done a vital work in guarding the
standards of professional training and conduct, but they offer
the only avenue to solidarity, and in the last resolve the most ef-
fective means of inspiration and of discipline. The profession
should not rest content until every lawyer worthy of the name is
inscribed upon their rolls.
But grave as these things are, and great as is the service which
a bar association can render to the law as a vocation, there are other
functions even more exalted. The excelling call upon both law and
lawyers must forever be the pursuit of justice and the advancement
of jurisprudence,-that justice which Justinian defines as "the
set and constant purpose which gives every man his due," and that
jurisprudence which he describes as "the knowledge of things di-
vine and human, the science of the just and the unjust". In the
scales of God and man we are to be weighed by our success or failure
in this pursuit, and in this field, unlimited by any bounds save
those of time and space, there is labor enough for us all.
It is the fashion to charge against lawyers that they are over
fond of fixed rules and precedents, and too greatly immersed in
the study of the past to give proper heed to present and future de-
mands. But who better than the lawyer should know that -juris-
prudence, if it is to be the handmaid of justice, must be a living
thing, growing, expanding and developing with the living things
which it serves; that it must constantly adapt itself to the changing
modes and manners and ideas of men; and that while it need not
forget the accumulated experience of the past, it must strive un-
tiringly to clear the path for the oncoming future. I should like
in what I have to say to you tonight to demonstrate that the Am-
erican lawyer has not been insensible to these considerations; and
that by a very notable contribution to the jurisprudence of his day
2
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he has set forward the coming of justice between both men and
nations.
The incidents of which I wish to speak begin at the old City
Hall in Philadelphia in the year of 1793, when the case of Oswald,
Administrator v. State of New York,' was called in the new-born
Supreme Court of the United States. New York furnished both
the scenario and the principal actors. The Chief Justice who
presided was a New York lawyer, and the Marshal, Matthew
Clarkson, is reputed to have been the only person in behalf of
whose appointment to office John Jay ever interested himself.
Upon the calling of the case, he was directed to proclaim that
"any person having authority to appear for the State of New
York is required to appear accordingly"; and when no one had
come forward in response, it was ordered by the Court that "un-
less the State appears by the first day of the next Term to the
above suit or show cause to the contrary, judgment will be entered
by default against the State."
Who was Oswald, who was his decedent, what the claim against
the state, and for what reason a different counsel appeared in
his behalf each time that the case was noted by the Court-these
things, as well as the terms of the settlement which removed it
from the docket, are not entered in the volumes of the reports;
but though the actors and their memories have long since passed
away, the event in which they participated was nothing less than
the first assertion by the newly established Court of its jurisdiction
over the sovereign states of the Union, and its right to adjudicate
against them. True, at a still earlier term notice was taken of a
suit by one Vanstophorst and others v. State of Maryland,2 in
which the illustrious names of Luther Martin and Edmund Ran-
dolph appear as opposing counsel; but the voluntary discontin-
uance of this case without costs to either party, leaves to the Os-
wald Case the distinction of being the first in which the power
of the Court to render judgment in invitum was boldly avowed.
One wonders whether any of those who were present on that
occasion sensed its significance or realized how great a force had
entered the life of the nation. Certainly Jay himself did not,
or he could never have written eight years later that he
"left the bench perfectly convinced that under a system
so defective it would not obtain the energy, weight and
dignity which were essential to its affording due support to
1 2 Dal]. 415 (17D3).
2 2 Daln. 401 (1792).
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the national government; nor acquire the public confidence
and respect which, as a last resort of the justice of the nation
it should possess." 3
Perhaps it seemed to him and others a wholly natural occurrence.
Judicial controversies to which states were parties were of course
not new in history or unknown in America. Classical scholars as
were so many of the, men of that day, they ! had read of Greece and
her Amphictyonic Councils, and knew th.t under the Holy Roman
Empire the Imperial Chamber and the Aulic Council had quarreled
down the centuries over their respective jurisdictions. Disputes
between the, colonies had been more than once submitted' to the
king sitting in council4 and sone which existed in 1776 were still
in being when the Constitution itself was adopted. Under the
Articles of Confederation, Congress as the last resort on appeal
"in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter
may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, juris-
diction or any other cause whatever", had proceeded to set up its
Court of Commissioners and to adjudicate between disputant
states.8 In the Convention itself the judicial power had been
extended without serious debate to such controversies, and Hamil-
ton in the Federalist 7 dismisses the subject with little more than
a paragraph and the conclusion that "whatever practices may
have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the states, are
proper objects of federal Puperintenaence and control." But
we who stand at greater distance and can observe the beneficent
working of this institution throughout one hundred and thirty
years cannot contemplate the beginning of its functions without
some sense of awe.
What was it, after all, which made the creation of the court so
great a departure that DeTocqueville felt warranted in declaring
that he was not aware that any nation of the globe had theretofore
constituted a judicial power in the same manner as the Americans;
and which evoked from Sir Henry Maine the expression that
"The success of this experiment has blinded men to its nov-
elty. There is no exact precedent for it, either in the ancient
or the modern world."
In the connection which we are now considering, the novelty was
3 Letter to President Adams, January 2, 1801, In PELLEW, LIFE OF JAY, 338.
4 Colony of Rhode Island v. Colony of Connecticut, 1727, 3 Acts of the Privy Coun-
ciL, COLONIAL SERIES, 10; Colony of Rhode Island v. Colony of Massachusetts, 1746,
3 Acts of the Privy Council, COLONIAL SnRnsS, 436.
5 Article IX.
6 Pennsylvania v. Connecticut, 131.U S., Appendix xii (1782).
7 THE FEDERALIST, no. 80.
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this--that the Supreme Court of the United States was the first
permanent court for the administration of international justice;
a court composed, not of judges or commissioners selected for
the event, but of permanent judges holding office by fixed tenure,
and indifferent to smile or frown from the mighty litigants whose
claims they were to be called upon to weigh; a fixed and continu-
ing tribunal to whose arbitrament the states, having laid aside
the power to make war and even the independent right to nego-
tiate, covenanted in perpetuity to submit.
"The Supreme Court of the Federation", says John Stuart
Mill in his "Representative Government", "dispenses interna-
tional law, and is' the first great example of what is n:ow one of
the most prominent wants of civilized society, a real International
Tribunal."
I shall not ask you tonight to plod with me through the reported
eases. Were the subject less serious and the tribunal less august,
you might remind me, did I attempt it, of the irreverent soul who
borrowed Byron's language to describe law reports, all and sun-
dry, as
"Smooth, solid monuments of mental pain,
The petrifactions of the plodding brain."
I invite you, however, to a hurried survey of the journey which
the court has come and of some of the questions with which it
has been called upon to deal. Brave as was the opening more than
half a century was to elapse before any final judgment was given
against a litigant state; practically a century before a state should
sue the Union or the Union sue a state; and at the end of one
hundred and thirty years the limits of the court's mighty power
are still unmarked and the catalogue of possible controversies is
still incomplete. Indeed, the court itself has said that
"It would be objectionable, and indeed, impossible, for the
court to anticipate by definition what controversies can and
what cannot be brought within the original jurisdiction of
this court." 8
It is interesting to observe that the first six cases in which
states were impleaded were all suits by private persons based upon
money demahds, with New York, as I have said, at the head of the
list. The rapidity with which they followed one another is suggest-
ive of what would have happened if the decision in Chislwim v.
8 Shiras, J., in Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 241 (1900).
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GeorgW, had not roused the country to its danger and provoked
the Eleventh Amendment in time to prevent a further growth.
New York again signalized herself by instituting in 1799 the first
case in which two states confronted each other, when she vainly
petitioned 0 for an injunction against the State of Connecticut
and her citizens to suspend actions of ejectment for lands in
the so-called Connecticut Gore. Not until the decision in 1846
between Rhode Island and Massachusetts1 was final judgment
rendered in such controversy; and not until Kentucky sought in
1860 to compel by mandamus the State of Indiana, or rather, its
Governor, Dennison, to surrender a fugitive freedman to justice"
did anything other than a boundary dispute engage the attention
of the Court.
In this part of the federal domain, however, as in so many others,
the Civil War marked the end of the period of quiescence. Cases
have trodden upon each other's heels since that day, until no less
than thirty-eight states of the Union-Alabama, Arkansas, Col-
orado, Connecticut, Georgia, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming-have appeared before the court as
plaintiffs or defendants or both in suits with their sovereign sisters.
Three times has the Union brought its own suit against a state; and
five times, at the suit of a state, has it appeared as defendant of rec-
ord in its own highest tribunal. Nor should one in summing up the
toll of litigants pass over -without notice the two occasions in which
the grant of jurisdiction over suits by a foreign nation against
a state has been invoked. The, first of these, of course, was the
case of the Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia," which
failed upon the ground that the Cherokee Tribe was not a foreign
state; and the other was the recent suit filed by The Republic of
Cuba v. The State of North Carolina14 to recover on some of the
defendant's repudiated bonds and which Cuba, of its own volition,
elected to withdraw.
But even more imposing than the roll-call of parties is the
0 2 Dall. 419 (1793).
10 New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1 (1799).
1 4 How. 591 (1846).
,0 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1860).
Is 5 Pet. 1 (1831).
14 242 U. S. 665, 37 Sup. Ct. 695 (1916).
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variety of subjects which they have sought to litigate; subjects
which have involved the welfare of the contending states and of
their citizens, which had their appeal both to ambition and to
pride, and which in not a few instances had already kindled the
hot fires of passion and resentment. Some of these quarrels have
had a territorial, some a financial, some a political basis; and
for many a lesser cause, as history demonstrates, nations have not
infrequently plunged headlong into war.
Numerically, territorial differences stand at the head of the
list. Inaccuracies in charters, mistakes by surveyors, ambiguities
in descriptions, have bred their crop of difficulties; and in more
than one instance the forces of nature have lent theii aid to con-
troversy by turning great rivers from their ancient beds. The
attendant circumstances make three of these territorial controv-
ersies especially notable.
The great case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,15 is more than
a landmark; it is a beacon light. The territory involved was not
extensive-only some eighty or a hundred square miles on the
south side of the River Charles with perhaps five thousand in-
habitants-but the issues discussed went far beyond the interests
of the contending states, perhaps in their influence even beyond
the confines of the nation, for here it was that the Court de-
fended the wide sweep of its jurisdiction and laid down the
principles by which it has since been governed. Smallest of all
the sisterhood of states, there is something suggestive in the fact
that Rhode Island has litigated in turn her boundaries upon the
west, the north and the east, and doubtless only the fact that the
Atlantic Ocean is not amenable to process has debarred her from
litigation to the south as well. But what, one may ask, are courts
for if not to protect the small against the great, the weak against
the strong, and to administer justice to all upon equal terms?
Massachusetts put forward in her defense Austin, her Attorney
General, and Daniel Webster, the leader of her bar, who moved
to dismiss the bill of Rhode Island on the ground that the question
involved was not judicial, but "in its character political; in the
highest degree political; brought by a sovereign, in that avowed
character for the restitution of sovereignty". It was a motion
which struck at the whole future usefulness of the court; and
Hazard, for Rhode Island, answered in ringing sentences:
"Suppose the controversy is political in its nature; what
Decision dismissing bill on the merits, 4 How. 591 (1846).
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then? Is there any reason in nature why it should not be
subjected to judicial investigation and decision as much as
any other controversy? Suppose the parties to it are two
states; what then? Is there any reason in nature why they
should not be governed by the laws and principles of justice
as much as any other parties ?-16
Over the dissent of Chief Justice Taney, the Court rejected the
narrow construction contended for by counsel for Massachusetts.
It held in effect that there is no lasting magic in the word "'po-
litical", but that all questions may be made judicial if quarreling
states will have it so. Said Mr. Justice Baldwin:
"The founders of our government could not but know, what
has ever been and, is familiar to every statesman and jurist,
that all controversies between nations are, in this sense, po-
litical and not judicial, as none but the sovereign can settle
them .... The submission by the sovereigns or states to a
court of law or equity, of a controversy between them, without
prescribing any rule of decision, gives power to decide accord-
ing to the appropriate law of the case; which depends on the
subject matter, the source and nature of the claims of the
parties and the law which governs them. From the time of
such submission, the question ceases to be a political one, to
be decided by the sic vola, sic jubeo, of political power; it
comes to the court to be decided by its judgment, legal dis-
cretion, and solemn consideration of the rules of law appro-
priate to its nature as a judicial question, depending on the
exercise of judicial power; as it is bound to act by known and
settled principles of national or municipal jurisprudence as
the case requires." 17
The second case, unique in its dramatic setting, is the suit of
Virginia to regain the picturesque and fertile counties of Berkeley
and Jefferson from the warborn state of West Virginia.' It
came while the embers of civil war still smouldered. When
the ordinance of secession was passed at Richmond, the people
of the northwestern part of the state refused to acquiesce
and organized themselves to defend the Union. A convention was
called which undertook to elect a "Restored Government of Vir-
ginia", composed of Union sympathizers, and this "Restored
Government" came ultimately to give its consent to the separation
of the state. An ordinance was passed creating the new state
and providing that in addition to the counties expressly included,
others, amofig them Berkeley and Jefferson, might be joined after
16 12 Peters 657, 692-3 (1838).
IT Ibid., 737.
Is 11 Wall. 39 (1870).
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a popular plebiscite. To all this the legislature of the "Restored
Government", and later, the Congress of the United States, said
amen; although the consent of Congress did not run in express
terms to the inclusion of the two disputed counties. Things were
happening, however, in the Valley of Virginia at the time which
made the holding of a plebiscite directed against the Old Dominion
a hazardous undertaking; visitors, whose presence much disturbed
the normal life of the inhabitants, were coming and going in most
unexpected, not to say abrupt, fashion. Nothing could be done,
therefore, until 1863 when, in the language of the court, "elections
of some sort" were held with the assent of the legislature of the
"Restored Government", and West Virginia extended her juris-
diction to the counties in question. Then-Appoinattox; and in
December following a legislature of Virginia sitting at Richmond
which repealed all the acts by wl ich the "Restored Government"
had sought to give consent to the transfer of the counties. Check!
by Virginia; but, three months later, countercheck by a joint reso-
lution of Congress recognizing the transfer of the counties to West
Virginia and consenting thereto. Here was all the setting for an
American Alsace-Lorraine, a Virginia Irredenta, a controversy
to be settled only by the sword, had not the Court been there
to cut the knot by holding that there was adequate evidence of
consent both by Virginia and by Congress before the Virginia
Act of Repeal was passed.
Things had gone even further in a physical sense in the quarrel
between Louisiana and Missisippi 19 over the delimitation of their
oyster beds; for both had sent out th~eir armed patrols to the
disputed region, and only an agreement upon a neutral zone or
no-man's land averted a clash until resort could be had to the
Court.
In the class of cases which I have called financial are embraced
those seeking recovery on the public debts of the states or brought
to adjust the accounts between the states and the Federal Govern-
ment. Such were the great cases of South Dakota v. North Caro-
lina20 for recovery upon bonds issued by the latter in the roaring
days of Reconstruction, and the second suit of Virginia v. West Vir-
ginia2 ' to collect the proportion of the debt of the original common-
" 202 U. S. 1 (1905).
192 U. S. 286 (1904).206 U. S. 290 (1907); 209 U. S. 514 (1908); 220 U. S. 1 (1911); 222 U. S.
17 (1911); 231 U. S. 89 (1913) ; 234 U. S. 117 (1914) ; 238 U. S. 202 (1915);
241 U. S. 531 (1916) ; 246 U. S. 565 (1918).
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wealth assumed by the latter at the time of separation, of which
case I shall have something to say in another connection.
But the cases which are at once the most novel and suggestive
are those which may as well be frankly called political, being those
in which the plaintiff state, suing either in its own right or as
parens patriae, seeks redress because of injury due to the govern-
mental action of the defendant state. Here the power of the Court
reaches its full majesty and it becomes in the largest sense an ar-
biter of national destiny. It is not surprising that such responsi-
bilities have not been lightly assumed and that this was the last
domain which the Court was called upon to enter. It is, as the
Court has said,22 a jurisdiction of so delicate and grave a char-
acter as not to be exercised save when the necessity is absolute
and the matter itself properly justiciable. True, the complaint
of the Cherokee Nation against Georgia,23 in 1831, was of this char-
acter. It attacked, as contrary to treaties and Acts of Congress,
certain laws passed by the legislature of Georgia and sought to
prevent the assertion of rights and powers under them. Finding,
however, that the Cherokees were not in fact or in law a foreign
state, the Court was not compelled to decide the broader question
of its jurisdiction over the snbject matter. But Chief Justice Mar-
shall, in closing his opinion, felt it necessary expressly to reserve
the point by saying:
"A serious additional objection exists to the jurisdiction of
the Court. Is the matter of the bill the proper subject for
judicial inquiry and decision ? It seeks to restrain a state from
the forcible exercise of legislative power over a neighboring
people asserting their independence, their right to which the
State denies. . . . The bill requires us to control the legis-
lature of Georgia, and to restrain the exertion of its physical
force. The propriety of such an interposition by the Court
may well be questioned. It savors too much of the exercise
of political power to be within the proper province of the
judicial department. But the opinion on the point respecting
parties makes it unnecessary to decide this question."2
4
It is a far cry from such cautious utterance to the bold declaration
in Missouri v. IMlinois,25 the Chicago Drainage Canal Case, that
the jurisdiction and authority of the Court to deal with a situation
which, if it arose between independent sovereignties, might lead to
= Fuller, C. J., in Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1 (1900).
= 5 Pet 1 (1831).
IbiN&, 20.
- 200 U. S. 496, 518 (1906).
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1922], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol28/iss3/2
INTERNATIONMAL JUSTICE
war, is not open to doubt; and to the equally sweeping assertion
in Kansas v. Colorado,26 a bill brought to prevent Colorado and
those licensed by her from appropriating the waters of the Arkan-
sas River, that
"Whenever the action of one state reaches through the agency
of natural laws into the territory of another state, the ques-
tion of the extent and limitations of the rights of the two
states becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them,
and this court is called upon to settle that dispute in
such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at
the same time establishing justice between them." 27
and again:
"As Congress cannot make compacts between the states, as
it cannot, in'respect to certain matters by legislation compel
their separate action, disputes between them must be settled
either by force or else by appeal to tribunals empowered to de-
termine the right and wrong thereof. Force under our system
of Government is eliminated. The clear language of the Con-
stitution vested in this Court the power to settle those dis-
putes. "28
No doubt statements so general as these must not be pressed too
far, and the facts of a particular case, or even the predilection of
individual judges will lead to their qualification; but undeniably
they indicate the general trend and temper of the court.
The case of Louisiana v. Texas,2" can hardly be treated as mark-
ing a reverse tendency. The bill in that ca-e alleged that the state
of Texas through her governor and health officer, under guise of
quarantine regulations against yellow fever, had imposed an ab-
solute embargo upon intercourse with the city of New Orleans
and had virtually declared commercial war against Louisiana, her
principal port and its citizens. If one may judge by the opinions
filed, the Court was not without difficulty in agreeing upon the
true reason for dismissing the bill. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller was
of opinion that the state of Texas had not made the action of her
governor or health officer her own, and that a controversy between
states did not arise merely because the citizens of one were in-
jured by the maladministration of the laws of another; a position
which should be compared with the holding in Kentucky v. Den-
nison,30 that a suit against a governor of a state in his official ca-
-206 U. S. 46 (1907).2bThL, 97.
2S Ibid.
" 176 U. S. 1 (1900).
0 Supra, note 12.
11
Davis: International Justice
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1922
WEST VIR GINIA LAW QUABTEBLY
pacity is a suit against the state. Mr. Justice Harlan held that as
no property right of the state was invaded and Congress alone
was vested with authority over interstate commerce, Louisiana
could not sue in her sovereign or corporate capacity. Mr. Justice
Brown put forward the still narrower and more debatable ground
that since only the citizens of New Orleans and not those of the
state of Louisiana in general were interested, the state was not the
proper party complainant, while Mr. Justice White contented
himself with a concurrence "in the result."
Further light may be expected from the decision of some of the
eight or ten cases which are now pending before the Court. Three
of these are especially interesting since they raise, albeit under
very different circumstances, the fundamental question of the pow-
er of a state over its own natural resources. In Wyoming v. Colo-
rado," dealing with the flow of the Laramie River, it is the conten-
tion of Colorado that she enjoys a prior right to utilize all the
water that falls upon her soil; and the court is thus faced again
with the issue of relative right in the water of interstate streams
which it evaded in the earlier case of Kansas v. Colorado:.2
The other two cases are those of the states of Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania against the state of West Virginia;33 and since it becomes
necessary to introduce once more the name of the state of my own
nativity as a litigant, it seems a filial duty, at the risk of some di-
gression, to point out to you that her frequent appearances in that
role have not been of her own seeking. Sued as she has been in
turn by Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Ohio, and shot at
occasionally across the Kentucky border, let me assure you that
she asks on behalf of the simple, peace-loving and law-abiding
mountaineers who make up her population, nothing more than that
her litigious neighbors may leave her in peace.
Faced by a steady depletion of her natural gas, her legislature
passed three years ago a statute requiring all natural gas com-
panies operating within the state to furnish to her citizens a rea-
sonably adequate supply of gas, to the extent of their several re-
sources, with power in the public service commission of the state
to direct companies having a surplus production to furnish gas to
those whose supply was insufficient to meet the demands of their
customers. For Ohio and Pennsylvania, appearing as consumers
in their governmental institutions and as parens patriae for their
1 Oct. Term, 1921.
82 Supra, note 26.
23 Oct. Term, 1921.
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citizens, it is said that such an act by increasing consumption in
West Virginia will diminish the quantity available for export to
them from the common reservoir, with resultant damage to their
citizens; and they pray that the Act may be declared invalid as a re-
striction upon commerce and its enforcement by the state of West
Virginia enjoined. Since the cases having been argued last Decem-
ber are now restored to the docket for reargument, comment upon
them would be improper; but the implications flowing from such
suits are obvious and far-reaching.
We need not endeavor upon this occasion to do what the court
has expressly refused to attempt, and seek out the bounds and
limits of its jurisdiction. It is enough for the present to mark the
steady advance in its scope and power; the increasing resort to
its umpirage by the states, and the healthful habit of peaceful
settlement which has thereby come to make its abode with us. To
quote the court again, it sits as an international as well as a domes-
tic tribunal, applying Federal law, state law and international
law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand ;34 and
by its successive decisions is practically building up what may not
improperly be called interstate common law.8 5
Through all the opinions by which this process is being ac-
complished there runs like a golden thread the consciousness of the
Court's great responsibilities and a realization of the august char-
acter of the litigants before it. No technical rules of practice or of
pleading have been permitted to leave room for the slightest in-
ference that "anything but the largest justice after the amplest;
opportunity to be heard has in any degree entered into the dis-
position of the case.'"" So far from grasping at jurisdiction it has
been declared that before the Court should intervene "the case
should be of serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the
principle to be applied should be one which the Court is prepared
deliberately to maintain against all considerations on the other
side." 7 -'While more than once action has proceeded upon the de-
liberate theory that "great states have a temper superior to that
of private litigants. "138
Most notable of all, however, is the great fact that the power
and influence of the Court rests upon no appeal to force or resort
Fuller, C. J., in Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 146 (1902).Brewer, J., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 97 (1907).
w White, C. J., in Virginia v. West Virginia, 234 U. S. 117, 121 (1914) ; Taney, C.
J., in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 210, 257 (1840).
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 521 (1906). See also New York v. New Jer-
seL 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492, 496 (1921).
Holmes, J., Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U. S. 1, 36 (1911).
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to coercion. Indeed, it has been slow to assert that such a resort
was possible. On the contrary, it has preferred to presume that
no state
"which holds prerogative rights for the good of its citizens, and
by the Constitution has agreed that those of any other state
shall enjoy rights, privileges and immunities in each, as its own
do, will either do wrong or deny right to a sister state or its
citizens, or refuse to submit to those decrees of this Court ren-
dered pursuant to its own delegated authority."39
It was in such language that the Court disposed of the contention
put forward by Webster and Austin in Rhode Island v. Massa-
chusetts, that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide, since it lack-
ed the power to enforce.
This objection had been heard before; it was to recur again.
The Court had already decided that if a state should fail or refuse
to appear in answer to its process, no coercive measures would be
taken to compel its appearance, but the complainant would be al-
lowed to proceed ex parte." Edmund Randolph had mooted the
question upon argument in Chisholm v. Georgia,41 and had receded
from it, in the lurid rhetoric of the day, as too awful for contem-
plation.
"Still," said he, "we may be pressed with the final question:
'What if the State is resolved to oppose the execution?' This
would be an awful question indeed! He to whose lot it should
fall to solve it would be impelled to invoke the God of Wisdom
to illuminate his decision. . . . I will not believe that in
the wide and gloomy theatre over which his eye should roll,
lie might perchance catch a distant glimpse of the Federal arm
uplifted. . . . Rather, let me hope and pray, that not a
single star in the American Constellation will ever suffer its
lustre to be diminished by hostility against the sentence of a
court, which itself has adopted."
In Kentucky v. Dennison,2 the Court declared the general gov-
ernment without any coercive means to compel the governor of
Ohio to honor a requisition from Kentucky for a fugitive from
justice. In South Dakota v. North Carolina,43 on the other hand,
enforcement was attained by the foreclosure of a mortgage on spe-
cific property. It was left, I regret to say, for litigation between
.89 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts. 12 Pet. 657, 751 (1838).
O0 Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 320 (1796) ; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, supra,
-:note 39, page 755.
"1 1 Dal]. 419, 427 (1793).
24 How. 66 (1860).
192 U. S. 286 (1904).
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Virginia and West Virginia to raise th) question in a form which
brooked no evasion.
The facts were these. Upon the severance of the state of Vir-
ginia and the formation of West Virginia, it was ordained that
the new state should assume an equitable proportion of the public
debt of the original commonwealth; and for more than fifty years
thereafter, the subject was a bone of contention between the
mother state and her daughter. Negotiations for settlement proved
abortive, a new generation grew to manhood, and there spread
abroad in West Virginia-at least among the less informed-a
fixed conviction that upon a fair accounting no sum would be
found due from her to the parent state. There is no counsel, as
perhaps this audience can attest, more eagerly embraced by any
debtor than that which assures him that 4~s debt is no longer due
or owing. The ritual observed upon the opening of each biennial
session of the West Virginia legislature became, first, prayer;
second, roll-call; and third, the adoption of a resolution denying
all liability on the "Virginia Debt". It was something of a
shock, therefore, to find the state baled before the Supreme Court
in 1906, and even more when after ten years of litigation a decree
went against her for over twelve millions of dollars. She had in-
sisted at the outset that the Court was without power to compel
payment; she remained of that opinion after the decree had been
entered, and so in 1917 the state of Virginia woke the question
which had been slumbering for a century by praying for a man-
damus requiring the legislature of West Virginia to levy a tax
to pay the judgment.44
That the court should decline so direct a challenge, at this date
in the life of the Republic, was perhaps impossible*; whether it
would have done so at an earlier day is mere matter of speculation.
It held, unequivocally, that there rested in the Court the certain
duty to enforce its judgment by appropriate remedies, even though
their exertion might .operate upon the governmental powers of the
state. It must be said that the discussion of the appropriate rem-
edy is less convincing; for after suggesting the possibility of Con-
gress coming to the aid of the Court and hinting at the power of
the Court itself to decide the amount and method of taxation to be
put into effect, the Court with a call for further argument post-
poned its decision and threw itself back once more upon the sense
of duty and the suggestions of self-interest of the contending
" 246 U. S. 565.
15
Davis: International Justice
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1922
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTEBLY
parties. It is gratifying to reflect that this last appeal was not
made in vain, and that an amicable adjustment by the states
themselves proved once more the moral power of the Court and vin-
dicated its confident reliance upon "a decent respect to the opin-
ions of mankind" as the ultimate sanction of its judgments.
And no.w, gentlemen, with the history of the Supreme Court
before us, what lesser place can be asigned to it in the structure
of our country than that given it by Washington himself as the
"chief pillar upon which the National government must rest",
the "keynote of our political fabric". Four long and bloody
years of fratricidal strife warn us, it is true, against overconfidence
or boasting; but they only prove that no barrier has yet been
built that can withstand the full floodtide of human passion. Who
of us would tear away the breakwater because it has been over-
leapt by a single storm; who would not rather as a prudent man
labor to strengthen and extend it?
A further question presses for its answer: How far do we as
a nation believe that our experiment in the administration of in-
ternational justice under judicial forms is worthy of imitation?
To what extent are we willing to make a like attempt in wider
fields? If either our example or our precept is to be relied upon,
there would seem. to be no doubt of the reply. More than a score
of times in our national life have we submitted disputes with
foreign powers to judicial arbitrament. Again and again our
legislative bodies and our chiefs of state have declared themselves
in favor of what President McKinley in his first inaugural called
"the leading feature. of our foreign policy throughout our entire
national history-the adjustment of difficulties by judicial meth-
ods rather than force of arms". Our delegates to the Peace Con-
ference at the Hague in 1899 and again in 1907 went expressly
charged to propose the creation of a permanent international trib-
unal; and we hailed as a laudable advance the halting steps of the
First Conference in setting up, and of the Second Conference in
improving, a permanent Court of Arbitration, even though it fell
far short of the instructions given by Secretary Root in 1907 to the
effect that:
"If there could be a tribunal which would pass upon ques-
tions between nations with the same impartial and impersonal
judgment that the Supreme Court of the United States gives
to questions arising between citizens of the different states
or between foreign citizens and the citizens of the United
States, there can be no doubt that nations would be more
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ready to submit their controversies to its decision than they
are now to take the chances of arbitration. It should be
your effort to bring about in the Second Conference a devel-
opment of the Hague tribunal into a permanent tribunal
composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else,
who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation,
and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of
international causes by judicial methods and under a sense
of judicial responsibility. . The Court should be made of
such dignity, consideration and rank that the best and ablest
jurists will accept appointment to it, and that the whole world
will have absolute confidence in its judgments."4 5
Of the tribunal thus established, however, it has been said that
"The Permanent Court is not permanent, because it is not
composed of permanent judges; it is not accessible, because
it has to be constituted for each case; it is not a court, because
it is not composed of judges."4 6
It was the "phantom of a court, an impalpable ghost, or to
speak more plainly, it created a clerk's office with a list." Never-
theless, the United States and Mexico, in the Pious Fund Case,
gave evidence of their faith by making themselves the first to
avail of its services.
But at last a Permanent Court of International Justice has
appeared; the dream of the ages is fulfilled within our day! Forty-
five states have approved it, its judges have been selected, its
labors are about to begin. Future ages may well say of us as we
do of those who witnessed the beginnings of the Supreme Court,
that we little appreciated the magnitude of the event. At least
the record of the bar of the state of New York will stand clear
and will furnish to you and your successors just pride in the fact
that he who was not only the first Chief Justice of the United
States, but first to negotiate a treaty of arbitration in the name
of the United States came from your ranks; that the chairman of
the delegation to the Second Hague Conference and the Secretary
of State who sent him were New York lawyers; that a leading
member of the Committee of Jurists who devised the plan for the
present Permanent Court, was once more a New York lawyer; and
finally, that a member of this bar, diplomat, scholar, statesman
and jurist, has by the suffrage of sovereign states been elevated
to a place upon its bench.
One year ago you evidenced your approval of the plan for the
45 INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES TO THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES
AND THEIR OFFICIAL REPORTS, Edited by James Brown Scott, 79.
' Address of James Brown Scott, Technical Delegate to the Second Hague Con-
ference, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, 319.
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Court by an appropriate resolution in which you recommended
that suitable provision might be made to enable the United States
to take part in the organization of the Court, and to be represented
on its membership. I take it you are of the same opinion still.
Nevertheless by some strange inconsistency, the word of American
approval remains still to be spoken. In the light of all our past
professions, how shall we explain our silence? Is it that we have
come to disapprove or distrust the principle of judicial settle-
ment of international disputes? Our whole history refutes it. Is
it that we dislike permanency in a court created for the purpose?
To those who so declare let us reply in the language of the proph-
et,--'Ye have not looked unto the maker thereof; neither had
respect unto him that fashioned it long ago." Or is it that we
wish for some mere fancy of our own to raze the structure to its
foundations in order to follow the painful process of its slow
re-building? Do we supinely wait for the coming of that impossible
day, which never was on sea or land, when a scheme can be de-
vised to win universal consent?
Let us speak plainly to one another. Discussions of the foreign
relations of the United States have not only cut to the quick in
the last three years; they have also touched many on the raw.
Without design to apportion either praise or blame, is it not true
that much thinking during that time has been colored by prejudice,
and many utterances have been inspired by passion? Perhaps it
is inherent in democracy that emotion shall play a large part
in popular decision. But soon or late, passion and partisanship
must have their day and realism-the only realism that is lasting-
realism inspired by great ideals and lofty purposes--realism resting
not alone on finite reason but on faith-must come into its own.
For if we, the fathers, have eaten sour grapes, let not our children's
teeth be thereby set on edge.
When the hour of cahn reflection strikes, who will deny that
the place of America is by the side of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, to which by example and precept she has
been so great a contributor? Will not sentiment, reason
and self-interest then show the way to her full participation and
support? And when revolving years have brought the Court
to its full development and fruition, when it numbers upon its rolls
all the nations that go to make civilized society, and when sovereign
states bow to the moral force of its decrees,
"Yea, truth and justice then
Shall down return to men."
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